ACLU Letter to the House Armed Services Committee Strongly Supporting the Davis Amendment to the FY 2007 National Defense Authorization Act (5/2/2006)

Support the Davis Amendment to the FY 2007 National Defense Authorization Act

Dear Representative:

The American Civil Liberties Union strongly urges you to support an important women’s health amendment that will be offered by Representative Susan Davis during the House Armed Services Committee’s consideration of the FY 2007 National Defense Authorization Act.

The Davis amendment would ensure that all U.S. servicewomen and military dependents, regardless of where they are stationed, have equal access to comprehensive reproductive health care. Current law prohibits women from obtaining abortion services at U.S. military hospitals, even if they pay for these services with their own private funds. The Davis amendment does not require the Department of Defense to pay for abortion services. Rather, it would simply repeal the current dangerous ban on privately funded abortion care and allow U.S servicewomen to use their own private funds to obtain abortion services at U.S. military hospitals.

For military women and dependents stationed overseas, the current restriction poses grave health risks. Local facilities are often inadequate or entirely unavailable, and traveling to a safe facility can result in delays that may substantially increase the risks of an abortion procedure. Moreover, it can be it extremely difficult for military women to access abortion services off base. Retired Lieutenant General Claudia Kennedy, the highest-ranking woman ever to serve in the United States Army, has spoken out again this ban, explaining that it is “imperative that our soldiers have access to safe, confidential abortion services at U.S. military hospitals overseas.” General Kennedy noted that a soldier’s situation is “different from that of a civilian woman” because “she is subject to the orders of the officers appointed over her. Every hour of her day belongs to the U.S. Army and she must have her senior’s permission to leave her place of duty.”

The ban on privately funded abortions also discriminates against women and their families who have volunteered to serve their country and have been assigned to military posts overseas. These women are prohibited from exercising their fundamental constitutional right to choose simply because of their military service and where they have been stationed. In a letter to Congress dated May 7, 1999, the Department of Defense opposed this harmful restriction, emphasizing “it is unfair to female service members, particularly those assigned to overseas locations, to be denied their constitutional right to the full range of reproductive health care.”

For all of these reasons, the ban on privately funded abortions should be repealed. The ACLU urges you to support the Davis Amendment and the health of our military women.

Sincerely,

Caroline Fredrickson, Director
Washington Legislative Office

Greg Nojeim, Associate Director
Washington Legislative Office

ACLU Letter to Congress Urging Opposition to the Animal Enterprise Act, S. 1926 and H.R. 4239 (3/6/2006)

Re: Animal Enterprise Act, S. 1926 and H.R. 4239

Dear Member of Congress:

On behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union, a non-partisan organization with hundreds of thousands of activists and members and 53 affiliates nation-wide, we write today to explain our opposition to the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, S. 1926 and H.R. 4239 (AETA), a bill that amends the Animal Enterprise Protection Act (AEPA), now 18 U.S.C. § 43. The AETA criminalizes First Amendment activities such as demonstrations, leafleting, undercover investigations, and boycotts. The bill is overly broad, vague, and unnecessary because federal criminal laws already provide a wide range of punishments for unlawful activities targeting animal enterprises.

It’s important to let the reader know what conduct is criminal under current law, too. What are the elements of the crime? Setting them forth now is useful to make your point that the bill criminalizes speech. The AEPA, which passed in 1992, created a penalty of $10,000 or 10 years to life imprisonment for any physical disruption that leads to $10,000 in damages to an animal enterprise. AETA expands the class of criminal behavior in 18 U.S.C. § 43, by changing the term used to described activity “for the purpose of causing physical disruption” to activity “for the purpose of damaging or disrupting” an animal enterprise. The overbroad class of “disruptive” activities apply to any and all activities that result in “losses and increased costs” in excess of $10,000.

Lawful and peaceful protests that, for example, urge a consumer boycott of a company that does not use humane procedures, could be the target of this provision because they “disrupt” the company’s business. This overbroad provision might also apply to a whistleblower whose intentions are to stop harmful or illegal activities by the animal enterprise. The bill will effectively chill and deter Americans from exercising their First Amendment rights to advocate for reforms in the treatment of animals.

Alarmingly, the bill would also make the expanded crime a predicate for Title III federal criminal wiretapping. This provision could be used for widespread domestic surveillance of animal rights organizations. A court will be far more likely to find probable cause for a vague crime of causing economic damage or disruption to an animal enterprise than for a crime that requires some evidence that the organization plans to engage in activity causing illegal “physical disruption.”

While the bill provides an exemption for “lawful public, governmental, or business reaction to the disclosure of information about an animal enterprise,” that exemption applies only to claims of economic “disruption” and not claims of economic “damage.” It also does not necessarily cover the entire range of expression protected by the First Amendment, which covers more than a lawful “reaction” to a “disclosure of information.” Ordinary persons would not understand which activities are prohibited and which are lawful.

The bill AETA also expands the types of facilities covered by the AEPA. The bill adds facilities that sell animals, expands the class of criminal behavior to include threatening conduct (which could have a chilling effect on legitimate whistleblowers) and expands the class of entities protected from the enterprise itself to persons connected to the enterprise. Finally, AETA doubles the criminal penalties and criminalizes attempts to disrupt, which creates a greater danger of encompassing protected speech.

Amendments to AEPA are unnecessary. The Department of Justice has successfully used the existing Animal Enterprise TerrorismProtection Act to obtain indictments of members of animal rights organizations alleged to have engaged in violent behavior. The ACLU urges you to oppose the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, S. 1926 and H.R. 4239.

We thank you for your consideration of our views.

Sincerely,

Caroline Fredrickson
Director, Washington Legislative Office

Lisa Graves,
Senior Counsel on Legislative Strategy

ACLU Applauds House Judiciary Action to Restore Habeas Corpus (9/6/2007)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Contact: media@dcaclu.org

Washington, DC – The American Civil Liberties Union is encouraged to see the House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties is meeting to mark up a vital bill to restore due process rights to detainees. H.R. 2826, introduced by Chairman Ike Skelton (D-MO) of the Armed Services Committee, will restore habeas corpus rights to those being detained by the United States government at the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility.

The following can be attributed to Christopher Anders, senior legislative counsel for the ACLU Washington Legislative Office:

“Congress must do the right thing and restore habeas rights. We live in a country that is governed by laws and a Constitution. This means not keeping people in detention camps for years without any charges against them, or any legal process for determining their future. The Bush Administration has not heeded the wisdom of our nation’s founding fathers who enshrined the idea of basic due process protections in the Constitution. We hope that today’s action shows that the House leadership will start to focus on a major reason why they were put in power—to restore constitutional checks and balances and make sure that no president will ever be a king or queen.”

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Contact: media@dcaclu.org

Washington, DC – The American Civil Liberties Union applauds today’s Senate vote of 56 to 43 on a procedural motion related to an amendment to the defense authorization bill that would restore habeas corpus rights. It is now clear that with a majority of senators voting for the amendment, habeas restoration is not only needed, but also desired by the Senate. To restore Habeas Corpus for those detained by the United States (S.AMDT. 2022), offered by Senators Specter (R-PA), Leahy (D-VT) and Dodd (D-CT), would restore the constitutional due process right of habeas corpus that was stripped away by the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA).

“Today’s vote was a victory for those seeking to restore both the rule of law and our nation’s Constitution,” said Caroline Fredrickson, director of the ACLU Washington Legislative Office. “The Military Commissions Act of 2006 stripped away one of our most fundamental rights – to challenge your imprisonment by the government. While the amendment ultimately was not filibuster proof, a majority of senators have made it clear that they want to restore the right of habeas corpus. The ACLU has worked diligently, leading a coalition of support for the restoration of habeas corpus. That tireless work is beginning to pay off and will be vindicated once habeas is signed back into law.”

The MCA stripped the constitutional right to habeas corpus from persons the president alone designates as enemy combatants. It allows our government to continue to hold hundreds of prisoners indefinitely at places like Guantanamo Bay, without ever charging them or giving them their day in court. The MCA was pushed through Congress just weeks ahead of the midterm elections in 2006.

Senators were voting to cut off debate to allow a vote on attaching the amendment to the fiscal 2008 defense measure, H.R. 1585, which authorizes funding for the Department of Defense for the upcoming year. Unfortunately, this procedural move by Republicans required 60 votes to attach an amendment, which means that habeas restoration did not make it into the defense measure at this point. However, this ploy cannot take away from the fact that a majority of senators feel habeas corpus and the rule of law should be returned to the American people.

“Senators Specter, Leahy and Dodd should be commended for their efforts to restore our Constitution. Almost a year ago, the Senate voted to strip habeas corpus protections from hundreds of people, but today a majority of senators voted for bringing back American values,” said Christopher Anders, legislative counsel for the ACLU. “Because of procedural hijinks by Bush’s allies, the habeas fix will not get in the bill at this time. But the majority vote gives a green light to future conferees that the Senate supports putting a habeas fix in legislation being sent to the president.”

# # #

Bills to Restore Habeas and Fix the MCA (Military Commissions Act of 2006)
ACLU Document

RESTORING THE CONSTITUTION ACT OF 2007 (H.R. 1415, S. 576)

* Ends indefinite detention. The RCA fixes the problems that the MCA caused in undermining the Constitution and the rule of law. It restores habeas corpus and due process at Guantanamo Bay and to other detainees held indefinitely by the federal government.
* Makes clear that the Constitution is the law of the land. The RCA stops any president from arbitrarily deciding who is an enemy combatant, ensures that no one will be prosecuted based on evidence literally beaten out of a witness and that no president can make up his or her own rules regarding torture and abuse.
* Ensures top government officials are held accountable. The bill makes sure that all felony torture and abuse can be prosecuted, even if the perpetrator is sitting in an office in Washington instead of serving as a private in the field.

HABEAS CORPUS RESTORATION ACT (H.R. 1416, S. 185)

* Restores fundamental American values. The Habeas Corpus Restoration Act restores the constitutional due process right of habeas corpus that the Congress and the President took away with the Military Commissions Act.
* Protects against unlawful detention. When we have people who have been held without charge in Guantanamo Bay for more than five years, there is nothing more fundamental than letting a court decide whether their continued detention is lawful.

TEXT OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER

July 17, 2007

Executive Order: Blocking Property of Certain Persons Who Threaten Stabilization Efforts in Iraq

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, as amended (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)(IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)(NEA), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,

I, GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the United States of America, find that, due to the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States posed by acts of violence threatening the peace and stability of Iraq and undermining efforts to promote economic reconstruction and political reform in Iraq and to provide humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people, it is in the interests of the United States to take additional steps with respect to the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13303 of May 22, 2003, and expanded in Executive Order 13315 of August 28, 2003, and relied upon for additional steps taken in Executive Order 13350 of July 29, 2004, and Executive Order 13364 of November 29, 2004. I hereby order:

Section 1. (a) Except to the extent provided in section 203(b)(1), (3), and (4) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(1), (3), and (4)), or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the date of this order, all property and interests in property of the following persons, that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of United States persons, are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in: any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense,

(i) to have committed, or to pose a significant risk of committing, an act or acts of violence that have the purpose or effect of:

(A) threatening the peace or stability of Iraq or the Government of Iraq; or

(B) undermining efforts to promote economic reconstruction and political reform in Iraq or to provide humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people;

(ii) to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, logistical, or technical support for, or goods or services in support of, such an act or acts of violence or any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order; or

(iii) to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order.

(b) The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section include, but are not limited to, (i) the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order, and (ii) the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.

Sec. 2. (a) Any transaction by a United States person or within the United States that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, or attempts to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.

(b) Any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.

Sec. 3. For purposes of this order:

(a) the term “person” means an individual or entity;

(b) the term “entity” means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization; and

(c) the term “United States person” means any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States.

Sec. 4. I hereby determine that the making of donations of the type specified in section 203(b)(2) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(2)) by, to, or for the benefit of, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order would seriously impair my ability to deal with the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13303 and expanded in Executive Order 13315, and I hereby prohibit such donations as provided by section 1 of this order.

Sec. 5. For those persons whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order who might have a constitutional presence in the United States, I find that, because of the ability to transfer funds or other assets instantaneously, prior notice to such persons of measures to be taken pursuant to this order would render these measures ineffectual. I therefore determine that for these measures to be effective in addressing the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13303 and expanded in Executive Order 13315, there need be no prior notice of a listing or determination made pursuant to section 1(a) of this order.

Sec. 6. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to the President by IEEPA as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate any of these functions to other officers and agencies of the United States Government, consistent with applicable law. All agencies of the United States Government are hereby directed to take all appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the provisions of this order and, where appropriate, to advise the Secretary of the Treasury in a timely manner of the measures taken.

Sec. 7. Nothing in this order is intended to affect the continued effectiveness of any rules, regulations, orders, licenses, or other forms of administrative action issued, taken, or continued in effect heretofore or hereafter under 31 C.F.R. chapter V, except as expressly terminated, modified, or suspended by or pursuant to this order.

Sec. 8. This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right, benefit, or privilege, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, instrumentalities, or entities, its officers or employees, or any other person.

GEORGE W. BUSH

THE WHITE HOUSE,

July 17, 2007.

Section 240.20 Disorderly Conduct

A person is guilty of disorderly conduct when, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof:

1. He engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior; or
2. He makes unreasonable noise; or
3. In a public place, he uses abusive or obscene language, or makes an obscene gesture; or
4. Without lawful authority, he disturbs any lawful assembly or meeting of persons; or
5. He obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic; or
6. He congregates with other persons in a public place and refuses to comply with a lawful order of the police to disperse; or
7. He creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which serves no legitimate purpose.

Posted by TAG - July 12, 2006 | Legal Library, Resources

A1 Felonies
150.20 Arson In The First Degree
105.17 Conspiracy In The First Degree
220.21 Criminal Possession Of A Controlled Substance In The First Degree
220.43 Criminal Sale Of A Controlled Substance In The First Degree
135.25 Kidnapping In The First Degree
125.27 Murder In The First Degree
125.25 Murder In The Second Degree
A2 Felonies
220.18 Criminal Possession Of A Controlled Substance In The Second Degree
220.41 Criminal Sale of A Controlled Substance In The Second Degree
B Violent Felonies 120.11 Aggravated assault upon a police officer or police officer
130.70 Aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree
150.15 Arson in the second degree
120.10 Assault in the first degree
140.30 Burglary in the first degree
130.75 Course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree
265.04 Criminal possession of a weapon in the first degree
265.13 Criminal sale of a firearm in the first degree
265.09 Criminal use of a firearm in the first degree
120.07 Gang assault in the first degree
215.17 Intimidating a victim or witness in the first degree
135.20 Kidnapping in the second degree
125.20 Manslaughter in the first degree
130.35 Rape in the first degree
165.15 Robbery in the first degree
130.50 Sodomy in the first degree
120.11 Aggravated assault upon a police officer or police officer
130.70 Aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree
150.15 Arson in the second degree
120.10 Assault in the first degree
140.30 Burglary in the first degree
130.75 Course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree
265.04 Criminal possession of a weapon in the first degree
265.13 Criminal sale of a firearm in the first degree
265.09 Criminal use of a firearm in the first degree
120.07 Gang assault in the first degree
215.17 Intimidating a victim or witness in the first degree
135.20 Kidnapping in the second degree
125.20 Manslaughter in the first degree
130.35 Rape in the first degree
165.15 Robbery in the first degree
130.50 Sodomy in the first degree
B Non-Violent Felonies 176.35 Aggravated insurance fraud
200.12 Bribe receiving in the first degree
200.04 Bribery in the first degree
105.15 Conspiracy in the second degree
115.08 Criminal facilitation in the first degree
145.12 Criminal mischief in the first degree
220.16 Criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree
165.54 Criminal possession of stolen property in the first degree
220.44 Criminal sale of a controlled substance in or near school grounds
220.39 Criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree
155.42 Grand larceny in the first degree
176.30 Insurance fraud in the first degree
230.32 Promoting prostitution in the first degree
215.13 Tampering with a witness in the first degree
158.25 Welfare fraud in the first degree
C Violent Felonies
130.67 Aggravated sexual abuse in the second degree
120.08 Assault on a peace officer, police officer, fireman, or EMT
140.25 Burglary in the second degree
265.03 Criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree
265.12 Criminal sale of a firearm in the second degree
265.14 Criminal sale of a firearm with the aid of a minor
265.08 Criminal use of a firearm in the second degree
120.06 Gang assault in the second degree
160.10 Robbery in the second degree
C Non-Violent Felonies
150.10 Arson in the third degree
200.11 Bribe receiving in the second degree
200.03 Bribery in the second degree
156.27 Computer tampering in the first degree
178.25 Criminal diversion of prescription medications first degree
115.05 Criminal facilitation in the second degree
220.09 Criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree
170.30 Criminal possession of a forged instrument in the first degree
221.30 Criminal possession of marijuana in the first degree
158.50 Criminal possession of public benefit cards in the first degree
165.52 Criminal possession of stolen property in the second degree
220.34 Criminal sale of a controlled substance in the fourth degree
265.16 Criminal sale of a firearm to a minor
220.65 Criminal sale of a prescription for a controlled substance
221.55 Criminal sale of marijuana in the first degree
100.13 Criminal solicitation in the first degree
190.42 Criminal usury in the first degree
170.15 Forgery in the first degree
155.40 Grand larceny in the second degree
176.25 Insurance fraud in the second degree
125.15 Manslaughter in the second degree
230.30 Promoting prostitution in the second degree
200.27 Receiving reward for official misconduct in the first degree
200.22 Rewarding official misconduct in the first degree
165.73 Trademark counterfeiting in the first degree
263.05 Use of a child in a sexual performance
125.13 Vehicular manslaughter in the first degree
158.20 Welfare fraud in the second degree
D Violent Felonies
125.45 Abortion in the first degree
130.66 Aggravated sexual abuse in the third degree
120.05 Assault in the second degree
130.80 Course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree
265.02 Criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree
265.11 Criminal sale of a firearm in the third degree
215.16 Intimidating a victim or witness in the second degree
130.65 Sexual abuse in the first degree
D Non-Violent Felonies
215.52 Aggravated criminal contempt
165.11 Auto-stripping in the first degree
215.57 Bail jumping in the first degree
200.45 Bribe giving for public office
215.20 Bribe receiving by a juror
180.25 Bribe receiving by a labor official
215.05 Bribe receiving by a witness
200.50 Bribe receiving for public office
200.10 Bribe receiving in the third degree
200.00 Bribery in the third degree
180.15 Bribery of a labor official
215.19 Bribing a juror
215.00 Bribing a witness
140.20 Burglary in the third degree
135.65 Coercion in the first degree
156.26 Computer tampering in the second degree
105.13 Conspiracy in the third degree
178.20 Criminal diversion of prescription medications second degree
145.10 Criminal mischief in the second degree
220.06 Criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree
170.25 Criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree
170.40 Criminal possession of forgery devices
221.25 Criminal possession of marijuana in the second degree
158.45 Criminal possession of public benefit cards in the second degree
165.50 Criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree
220.31 Criminal sale of a controlled substance in the fifth degree
221.50 Criminal sale of marijuana in the second degree
100.10 Criminal solicitation in the second degree
145.20 Criminal tampering in the first degree
140.17 Criminal trespass in the first degree
220.55 Criminally using drug paraphernalia in the first degree
235.22 Disseminating indecent material to minors in the first degree
260.34 Endangering the welfare of a vulnerable elderly person in the first degree
205.15 Escape in the first degree
170.10 Forgery in the second degree
170.75 Fraudently making of an electronic access device in the second degree
155.35 Grand larceny in the third degree
205.65 Hindering prosecution in the first degree
180.53 Impairing the integrity of a pari-mutuel betting system first
176.20 Insurance fraud in the third degree
235.07 Obscenity in the first degree
195.08 Obstructing governmental administration by means of a self-defense spray device
230.06 Patronizing a prostitute in the first degree
210.15 Perjury in the first degree
263.15 Promoting a sexual performance by a child
263.10 Promoting an obscene sexual performance by a child
205.25 Promoting prison contraband in the first degree
230.25 Promoting prostitution in the third degree
130.30 Rape in the second degree
120.25 Reckless endangerment in the first degree
160.05 Robbery in the third degree
130.45 Sodomy in the second degree
180.40 Sports bribing
120.60 Stalking in the first degree
215.12 Tampering with a witness in the second degree
175.25 Tampering with public records in the first degree
165.08 Unauthorized use of a vehicle in the first degree
120.04 Vehicular assault in the first degree
125.12 Vehicular manslaughter in the second degree
158.15 Welfare fraud in the third degree
E Felonies
260.00 Abandonment of a child
125.40 Abortion in the second degree
205.19 Absconding from a community treatment facility
205.17 Absconding from temporary release in the first degree
120.12 Aggravated assault upon a person less than eleven years old
240.31 Aggravated harassment in the first degree
240.32 Aggravated harassment of an employee by an inmate
150.05 Arson in the fourth degree
165.10 Auto-stripping in the second degree
215.56 Bail jumping in the second degree
145.23 Cemetary desecration in the first degree
180.08 Commercial bribe receiving in the first degree
180.03 Commercial bribing in the first degree
156.25 Computer tampering in the third degree
156.10 Computer trespass
105.10 Conspiracy in the fourth degree
240.15 Criminal anarchy
215.51 Criminal contempt in the first degree
178.15 Criminal diversion of prescription medications third degree
115.01 Criminal facilitation in the third degree
190.26 Criminal impersonation in the first degree
220.46 Criminal injection of a narcotic drug
240.71 Criminal interference with health care services or religious worship in the first degree
145.05 Criminal mischief in the third degree
240.46 Criminal nuisance in the first degree
156.35 Criminal possession of computer-related material
221.20 Criminal possession of marijuana in the third degree
220.60 Criminal possession of precursors of controlled substances
158.40 Criminal possession of public benefit cards in the third degree
165.45 Criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree
221.45 Criminal sale of marijuana in the third degree
100.08 Criminal solicitation in the third degree
158.35 Criminal use of a public benefit card in the first degree
190.76 Criminal use of an access device in the first degree
190.40 Criminal usury in the second degree
125.10 Criminally negligent homicide
135.50 Custodial interference in the first degree
195.20 Defrauding the government
235.21 Disseminating indecent material to minors in the second degree
250.05 Eavesdropping
260.32 Endangering the welfare of a vulnerable elderly person in the second degree
205.10 Escape in the second degree
240.60 Falsely reporting an incident in the first degree
175.10 Falsifying business records in the first degree
130.85 Female genital mutilation
170.65 Forgery of a vehicle identification number
155.30 Grand larceny in the fourth degree
241.05 Harassment of a rent regulated tenant
205.60 Hindering prosecution in the second degree
170.70 Illegal possession of a vehicle identification number
180.52 Impairing the integrity of a pari-mutuel betting system second
176.15 Insurance fraud in the fourth degree
215.15 Intimidating a victim or witness in the third degree
175.40 Issuing a false certificate
210.40 Making an apparently sworn false statement in the first degree
120.13 Menacing in the first degree
260.06 Non-support of a child in the first degree
235.06 Obscenity in the second degree
195.07 Obstructing governmental administration in the first degree
175.35 Offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree
230.05 Patronizing a prostitute in the second degree
210.10 Perjury in the second degree
240.62 Placing a false bomb in the first degree
263.16 Possessing a sexual performance by a child
263.11 Possessing an obscene sexual performance by a child
225.20 Possession of gambling records in the first degree
225.10 Promoting gambling in the first degree
130.25 Rape in the third degree
200.25 Receiving reward for official misconduct in the second degree
120.01 Reckless assault of a child by a child day care provider
180.57 Rent gouging in the first degree
200.20 Rewarding official misconduct in the second degree
240.06 Riot in the first degree
190.65 Scheme to defraud in the first degree
130.40 Sodomy in the third degree
180.45 Sports bribe receiving
120.55 Stalking in the second degree
135.55 Substitution of children
145.45 Tampering with a consumer product in the first degree
180.51 Tampering with a sports contest in the first degree
215.11 Tampering with a witness in the third degree
215.40 Tampering with physical evidence
165.72 Trademark counterfeiting in the second degree
165.06 Unauthorized use of a vehicl in the second degree
156.30 Unlawful duplication of computer-related material
215.70 Unlawful grand jury disclosure
135.10 Unlawful imprisonment in the first degree
165.07 Unlawful use of secret scientific material
190.39 Unlawfully concealing a will
170.60 Unlawfully using slugs in the first degree
120.03 Vehicular assault in the second degree
158.10 Welfare fraud in the fourth degree
A Misdemeanors
205.18 Absconding from a furlough program
205.16 Absconding from temporary release in the second degree
240.30 Aggravated harassment in the second degree
120.00 Assault in the third degree
165.09 Auto-stripping in the third degree
215.55 Bail jumping in the third degree
145.22 Cemetary desecration in the second degree
135.60 Coercion in the second degree
180.05 Commercial bribe receiving in the second degree
180.00 Commercial bribing in the second degree
215.45 Compounding a crime
156.20 Computer tampering in the fourth degree
105.05 Conspiracy in the fifth degree
215.50 Criminal contempt in the second degree
215.65 Criminal contempt of a temporary state commission
215.60 Criminal contempt of the legislature
215.66 Criminal contempt of the state commision on judicial conduct
178.10 Criminal diversion of prescription medications fourth degree
115.00 Criminal facilitation in the fourth degree
190.25 Criminal impersonation in the second degree
240.70 Criminal interference with health care services or religious worship in the second degree
145.00 Criminal mischief in the fourth degree
220.03 Criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree
170.20 Criminal possession of a forged instrument in the third degree
145.70 Criminal possession of a taximeter accelerating device
265.01 Criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree
221.15 Criminal possession of marijuana in the fourth degree
165.40 Criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree
190.27 Criminal sale of a police uniform
221.40 Criminal sale of marijuana in the fourth degree
100.05 Criminal solicitation in the fourth degree
170.45 Criminal stimulation
145.15 Criminal tampering in the second degree
140.15 Criminal trespass in the second degree
158.30 Criminal use of a public benefit card in the second degree
190.75 Criminal use of an access device in the second degree
220.45 Criminally possessing a hypodermic instrument
220.50 Criminally using drug paraphernalia in the second degree
135.45 Custodial interference in the second degree
240.21 Disruption or disturbance of religious service
250.20 Divulging an eavesdropping warrant
260.10 Endangering the welfare of a child
260.25 Endangering the welfare of an incompetent or physically disabled person
205.05 Escape in the third degree
190.20 False advertising
240.55 Falsely reporting an incident in the second degree
175.05 Falsifying business records in the second degree
170.05 Forgery in the third degree
185.00 Fraud in insolvency
185.05 Fraud involving a security interest
165.30 Fraudulent accosting
185.10 Fraudulent disposition of mortaged property
185.15 Fraudulent disposition of property subject to a conditional sale contract
165.20 Fraudulently obtaining a signature
200.30 Giving unlawful gratuities
195.12 Harming an animal trained to aid a person with a disability in the first degree
120.16 Hazing in the first degree
205.55 Hindering prosecution in the third degree
240.08 Inciting to riot
176.10 Insurance fraud in the fifth degree
175.45 Issuing a false financial statement
165.25 Jostling
195.06 Killing or injuring a police animal
240.37 Loitering for the purpose of engaging in prostitution offense
190.55 Making a false statement of credit terms
210.45 Making a punishable false written statement
210.35 Making an apparently sworn false statement in the second degree
145.60 Making graffiti
265.10 Manufacture, transport, disposition and defacement of weapons and dangerous instruments and appliances
120.14 Menacing in the second degree
165.00 Misapplication of property
215.30 Misconduct by a juror in the first degree
260.30 Misrepresentation by a child day care provider
260.05 Non-support of a child in the second degree
235.05 Obscenity in the third degree
195.15 Obstructing firefighting operations
195.05 Obstructing governmental administration in the second degree
175.30 Offering a false instrument for filing in the second degree
195.00 Official misconduct
230.04 Patronizing a prostitute in the third degree
210.05 Perjury in the third degree
155.25 Petit larceny
240.61 Placing a false bomb in the second degree
225.30 Possession of a gambling device
140.35 Possession of burglar’s tools
250.10 Possession of eavesdropping devices
225.15 Possession of gambling records in the second degree
190.45 Possession of usurious loan records
225.05 Promoting gambling in the second degree
205.20 Promoting prison contraband in the second degree
230.20 Promoting prostitution in the fourth degree
245.11 Public display of offensive sexual material
120.20 Reckless endangerment in the second degree
180.56 Rent gouging in the second degree
205.30 Resisting arrest
240.05 Riot in the second degree
190.60 Scheme to defraud in the second degree
190.70 Scheme to defraud the state by unlawfully selling prescriptions
125.55 Self-abortion in the first degree
130.60 Sexual abuse in the second degree
130.20 Sexual misconduct
120.50 Stalking in the third degree
145.40 Tampering with a consumer product in the second degree
215.25 Tampering with a juror in the first degree
180.50 Tampering with a sports contest in the second degree
215.10 Tampering with a witness in the fourth degree
175.20 Tampering with public records in the second degree
165.15 Theft of services
165.71 Trademark counterfeiting in the third degree
165.05 Unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree
156.05 Unauthorized used of a computer
215.80 Unlawful disposition of assets subject to forfeiture
135.05 Unlawful imprisonment in the second degree
165.17 Unlawful use of credit card, debit card or public benefit card
260.20 Unlawfully dealing with a child in the first degree
158.05 Welfare fraud in the fifth degree
B Misdemeanors
130.38 Consensual sodomy
105.00 Conspiracy in the sixth degree
240.45 Criminal nuisance in the second degree
170.47 Criminal possession of an anti-security item
221.10 Criminal possession of marijuana in the fifth degree
221.35 Criminal sale of marijuana in the fifth degree
145.14 Criminal tampering in the third degree
140.10 Criminal trespass in the third degree
250.35 Failing to report criminal communications
250.15 Failure to report wiretapping
190.23 False personation
240.50 Falsely reporting an incident in the third degree
165.35 Fortune telling
240.25 Harassment in the first degree
195.11 Harming an animal trained to aid a person with a disability in the second degree
190.05 Issuing a bad check
240.36 Loitering in the first degree
120.15 Menacing in the third degree
190.35 Misconduct by corporate official
230.03 Patronizing a prostitute in the fourth degree
230.40 Permitting prostitution
145.65 Possession of graffiti instruments
230.00 Prostitution
245.00 Public lewdness
145.25 Reckless endangerment of property
195.10 Refusing to aid a peace or a police officer
180.55 Rent gouging in the third degree
125.50 Self-abortion in the second degree
130.55 Sexual abuse in the third degree
120.45 Stalking in the fourth degree
215.23 Tampering with a juror in the second degree
250.25 Tampering with private communications
240.10 Unlawful assembly
190.50 Unlawful collection practices
215.75 Unlawful disclosure of an indictment
140.40 Unlawful possession of radio devices
260.21 Unlawfully dealing with a child in the second degree
250.30 Unlawfully obtaining communications information
170.55 Unlawfully using slugs in the second degree
Violations
240.40 Appearance in public under the influence of narcotics or a drug other than alcohol
100.00 Criminal solicitation in the fifth degree
240.20 Disorderly conduct
245.01 Exposure of a person
215.58 Failing to respond to an appearance ticket
240.26 Harassment in the second degree
120.17 Hazing in the second degree
240.35 Loitering
215.28 Misconduct by a juror in the second degree
245.05 Offensive exhibition
245.02 Promoting the exposure of a person
140.05 Trespass
265.06 Unlawful possession of a weapon upon school grounds
221.05 Unlawful possession of marijuana
240.65 Unlawful prevention of public access to records
145.30 Unlawfully posting advertisements

The Offense Level

New York State grades felonies from A to E. A is the most serious and E is the least serious. The least serious felony is punishable by more than one year in State Prison. Each felony is also labeled violent or nonviolent. Usually the rating of violence reflects the actual violence involved in the crime but not always. Burglary in the Second Degree, for example, is considered a “violent” crime even though violence has nothing to do with Burglary in the Second Degree.

Criminal History Category

This refers to the criminal history category of the accused.

*No Priors* – If the person in question has no felony convictions ever, that person falls in the “no priors” category. Someone also qualifies for the “no priors” category if he has no felony convictions in the last ten years. The ten years does not begin until the person is released from jail on a previous case. Youthful Offender findings do not count as prior convictions. Felony convictions in other states, the Federal system, or even other countries can be considered convictions in New York. The determination with respect to non-NY convictions can be extremely complex.

*Non-Violent Predicate* – A non violent predicate is a person who has been convicted of a non violent felony within the last ten years.

*Violent Predicate* – A violent predicate is a person who has been convicted of a violent felony within the last ten years.

*Persistent Felony Offenders* – If a person has two or more felony convictions in his past he may be a persistent felony offender and face LIFE in prison.

*Juvenile Offender* – Children 16 and younger can be prosecuted in adult criminal court for certain very serious crimes. Nevertheless, these children do not face the same jail sentences that adults face. We do not address Juvenile Offender sentences in the chart that follows.

*Youthful Offender* – People under 19 years old at the time of the alleged offense are usually eligible for Youthful Offender Treatment. If a person is found to be a “Youthful Offender” the person is not considered to be convicted of a crime by New York State. Also, a Youthful Offender is sentenced according to different rules from adults. A Youthful Offender can receive a maximum sentence of 1 1/3 – 4 years in prison. Youthful Offender treatment does not necessarily prevent the Federal Government from considering it a conviction for Immigration purposes.

Jail Time New York

Level A felonies are not listed here. They are the most serious of crimes for New York and all carry potential LIFE sentences. In the case of murder in the first degree, the potential for the DEATH penalty exists.

No Priors Non Violent Predicate Violent Predicate
B Violent Felony Lowest: 5 years in prison
Highest: 25 years in prison
Lowest: 8 years in prison
Highest: 25 years in prison
Lowest: 10 years in prison
Highest: 25 years in prison
B Non Violent Felony Lowest: 1 – 3 years prison
Highest: 8 1/3 – 25 years prison
Lowest: 4 1/2 – 9 years prison
Highest: 12 1/2 – 25 years
Lowest: 4 1/2 – 9 years prison
Highest: 12 1/2 – 25 years
C Violent Felony Lowest: 3 1/2 years in prison
Highest: 15 years in prison
Lowest: 5 years in prison
Highest: 15 years in prison
Lowest: 7 years in prison
Highest: 15 years in prison
C Non Violent Felony Lowest: No Jail (Probation possible)
Highest: 5 – 15 years in prison
Lowest: 3 – 6 years in prison
Highest: 7 1/2 – 15 years in prison
Lowest: 3 – 6 years in prison
Highest: 7 1/2 – 15 years in prison
D Violent Felony Lowest: 2 years in prison
Highest: 7 years in prison
Lowest: 3 years in prison
Highest: 7 years in prison
Lowest: 5 years in prison
Highest: 7 years in prison
D Non Violent Felony Lowest: No Jail (Probation possible)
Highest: 2 1/3 – 7 years in prison
Lowest: 2 – 4 years in prison
Highest: 3 1/2 – 7 years in prison
Lowest: 2 – 4 years in prison
Highest: 3 1/2 – 7 years in prison
E Violent Felony Lowest: 1 1/2 years in prison
Highest: 4 years in prison
Lowest: 2 years in prison
Highest: 4 years in prison
Lowest: 3 years in prison
Highest: 4 years in prison
E Non Violent Felony Lowest: No Jail
Highest: 1 1/3 – 4 years in prison
Lowest: 1 1/2 – 3 years in prison
Highest: 2 – 4 years in prison
Lowest: 1 1/2 – 3 years in prison
Highest: 2 – 4 years in prison
A Misdemeanor Lowest: No Jail
Highest: 1 year in jail
Lowest: No Jail
Highest: 1 year in jail
Lowest: No Jail
Highest: 1 year in jail
B Misdemeanor Lowest: No Jail
Highest: 90 days in jail
Lowest: No Jail
Highest: 90 days in jail
Lowest: No Jail
Highest: 90 days in jail
Violation Lowest: No Jail
Highest: 15 days in jail
Lowest: No Jail
Highest: 15 days in jail
Lowest: No Jail
Highest: 15 days in jail

U.S. Supreme Court
HEALY v. JAMES, 408 U.S. 169 (1972)
408 U.S. 169
HEALY ET AL. v. JAMES ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
No. 71-452.
Argued March 28, 1972
Decided June 26, 1972
Petitioners, seeking to form a local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) at a state-supported college, were denied recognition as a campus organization. Recognition would have entitled petitioners to use campus facilities for meetings and to use of the campus bulletin board and school newspaper. The college president denied recognition because he was not satisfied that petitioners’ group was independent of the National SDS, which he concluded has a philosophy of disruption and violence in conflict with the college’s declaration of student rights. Petitioners thereupon brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief. The District Court first ordered a further administrative hearing, after which the president reaffirmed his prior decision. Approving the president’s judgment, the District Court held that petitioners had failed to show that they could function free from the National SDS and that the college’s refusal to approve the group, which the court found “likely to cause violent acts of disruption,” did not violate petitioners’ associational rights. The Court of Appeals, purporting not to reach the First Amendment issues, affirmed on the ground that petitioners had failed to avail themselves of the due process accorded to them and to meet their burden of complying with the prevailing standards for recognition. Held:

1. The courts erred in (1) discounting the cognizable First Amendment associational interest that petitioners had in furthering their personal beliefs and (2) assuming that the burden was on petitioners to show entitlement to recognition by the college rather than on the college to justify its nonrecognition of the group, once petitioners had made application conformably to college requirements. Pp. 180-185.

2. Insofar as the denial of recognition to petitioners’ group was based on an assumed relationship with the National SDS, or was a result of disagreement with the group’s philosophy, or was a consequence of a fear of disruption, for which there was no support in the record, the college’s decision violated the petitioners’ First Amendment rights. A proper basis for nonrecognition might have [408 U.S. 169, 170] been afforded, however, by a showing that the group refused to comply with a rule requiring them to abide by reasonable campus regulations. Since the record is not clear whether the college has such a rule and, if so, whether petitioners intend to observe it, these issues remain to be resolved. Pp. 185-194.

445 F.2d 1122, reversed and remanded.

POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. BURGER, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 195. DOUGLAS, J., filed a separate opinion, post, p. 196. REHNQUIST, J., filed a statement concurring in the result, post, p. 201.

Melvin L. Wulf argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Eugene Z. DuBose, Jr., Alvin Pudlin, and Sanford Jay Rosen.

F. Michael Ahern, Assistant Attorney General of Connecticut, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Robert K. Killian, Attorney General.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General of California, and Donald B. Day, Deputy Attorney General, for the Board of Trustees of California State Colleges; by Frank G. Carrington, Jr., and Alan S. Ganz for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc.; and by Morris I. Leibman and Philip B. Kurland for the American Association of Presidents of Independent Colleges and Universities.

MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case, arising out of a denial by a state college of official recognition to a group of students who desired to form a local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), presents this Court with questions requiring the application of well-established First Amendment principles. While the factual background of this [408 U.S. 169, 171] particular case raises these constitutional issues in a manner not heretofore passed on by the Court, and only infrequently presented to lower federal courts, our decision today is governed by existing precedent.

As the case involves delicate issues concerning the academic community, we approach our task with special caution, recognizing the mutual interest of students, faculty members, and administrators in an environment free from disruptive interference with the educational process. We also are mindful of the equally significant interest in the widest latitude for free expression and debate consonant with the maintenance of order. Where these interests appear to compete the First Amendment, made binding on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, strikes the required balance.

I

We mention briefly at the outset the setting in 1969-1970. A climate of unrest prevailed on many college campuses in this country. There had been widespread civil disobedience on some campuses, accompanied by the seizure of buildings, vandalism, and arson. Some colleges had been shut down altogether, while at others files were looted and manuscripts destroyed. SDS chapters on some of those campuses had been a catalytic force during this period. [1]1 Although the causes of campus disruption were many and complex, one of the prime consequences of such activities was the denial of the lawful exercise of First Amendment rights to the majority of students by the few. Indeed, many of the most cherished characteristics long associated with institutions of higher learning appeared to be endangered. Fortunately, [408 U.S. 169, 172] with the passage of time, a calmer atmosphere and greater maturity now pervade our campuses. Yet, it was in this climate of earlier unrest that this case arose.

Petitioners are students attending Central Connecticut State College (CCSC), a state-supported institution of higher learning. In September 1969 they undertook to organize what they then referred to as a “local chapter” of SDS. Pursuant to procedures established by the College, petitioners filed a request for official recognition as a campus organization with the Student Affairs Committee, a committee composed of four students, three faculty members, and the Dean of Student Affairs. The request specified three purposes for the proposed organization’s existence. It would provide “a forum of discussion and self-education for students developing an analysis of American society”; it would serve as “an agency for integrating thought with action so as to bring about constructive changes”; and it would endeavor to provide “a coordinating body for relating the problems of leftist students” with other interested groups on campus and in the community. [2]2 The Committee, while satisfied that the statement of purposes was clear and unobjectionable on its face, exhibited concern over the relationship between the proposed local group and the National SDS organization. In response to inquiries, representatives of the proposed organization stated that they would not affiliate with any national organization and that their group would remain “completely independent.”

In response to other questions asked by Committee members concerning SDS’ reputation for campus disruption, the applicants made the following statements, [408 U.S. 169, 173] which proved significant during the later stages of these proceedings:

“Q. How would you respond to issues of violence as other S. D. S. chapters have?

“A. Our action would have to be dependent upon each issue.

“Q. Would you use any means possible?

“A. No I can’t say that; would not know until we know what the issues are.

. . . . .

“Q. Could you envision the S. D. S. interrupting a class?

“A. Impossible for me to say.”

With this information before it, the Committee requested an additional filing by the applicants, including a formal statement regarding affiliations. The amended application filed in response stated flatly that “CCSC Students for a Democratic Society are not under the dictates of any National organization.” [3]3 At a second hearing before the Student Affairs Committee, the question of relationship with the National organization was raised again. One of the organizers explained that the National SDS was divided into several “factional groups,” that the national-local relationship was a loose one, and that the local organization accepted only “certain ideas” but not all of the National organization’s aims and philosophies.

By a vote of six to two the Committee ultimately approved the application and recommended to the President [408 U.S. 169, 174] of the College, Dr. James, that the organization be accorded official recognition. In approving the application, the majority indicated that its decision was premised on the belief that varying viewpoints should be represented on campus and that since the Young Americans for Freedom, the Young Democrats, the Young Republicans, and the Liberal Party all enjoyed recognized status, a group should be available with which “left wing” students might identify. The majority also noted and relied on the organization’s claim of independence. Finally, it admonished the organization that immediate suspension would be considered if the group’s activities proved incompatible with the school’s policies against interference with the privacy of other students or destruction of property. The two dissenting members based their reservation primarily on the lack of clarity regarding the organization’s independence.

Several days later, the President rejected the Committee’s recommendation, and issued a statement indicating that petitioners’ organization was not to be accorded the benefits of official campus recognition. His accompanying remarks, which are set out in full in the margin, [4]4 indicate several reasons for his action. He [408 U.S. 169, 175] found that the organization’s philosophy was antithetical to the school’s policies, [5]5 and that the group’s independence was doubtful. He concluded that approval should [408 U.S. 169, 176] not be granted to any group that “openly repudiates” the College’s dedication to academic freedom.

Denial of official recognition posed serious problems for the organization’s existence and growth. Its members were deprived of the opportunity to place announcements regarding meetings, rallies, or other activities in the student newspaper; they were precluded from using various campus bulletin boards; and – most importantly – nonrecognition barred them from using campus facilities for holding meetings. This latter disability was brought home to petitioners shortly after the President’s announcement. Petitioners circulated a notice calling a meeting to discuss what further action should be taken in light of the group’s official rejection. The members met at the coffee shop in the Student Center (“Devils’ Den”) but were disbanded on the President’s order since nonrecognized groups were not entitled to use such facilities. [6]6 [408 U.S. 169, 177]

Their efforts to gain recognition having proved ultimately unsuccessful, and having been made to feel the burden of nonrecognition, petitioners resorted to the courts. They filed a suit in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the President of the College, other administrators, and the State Board of Trustees. Petitioners’ primary complaint centered on the denial of First Amendment rights of expression and association arising from denial of campus recognition. The cause was submitted initially on stipulated facts, and, after a short hearing, the judge ruled that petitioners had been denied procedural due process because the President had based his decision on conclusions regarding the applicant’s affiliation which were outside the record before him. The court concluded that if the President wished to act on the basis of material outside the application he must at least provide petitioners a hearing and opportunity to introduce evidence as to their affiliations. 311 F. Supp. 1275, 1279, 1281. While retaining jurisdiction over the case, the District Court ordered respondents to hold a hearing in order to clarify the several ambiguities surrounding the President’s decision. One of the matters to be explored was whether the local organization, true to its repeated affirmations, was in fact independent of the National SDS. Id., at 1282. And if the hearing demonstrated that the two were not separable, the respondents were instructed that they might then review the “aims and philosophy” of the National organization. Ibid. [408 U.S. 169, 178]

Pursuant to the court’s order, the President designated Dean Judd, the Dean of Student Affairs, to serve as hearing officer and a hearing was scheduled. The hearing, which spanned two dates and lasted approximately two hours, added little in terms of objective substantive evidence to the record in this case. Petitioners introduced a statement offering to change the organization’s name from “CCSC local chapter of SDS” to “Students for a Democratic Society of Central Connecticut State College.” They further reaffirmed that they would “have no connection whatsoever to the structure of an existing national organization.” [7]7 Petitioners also introduced the testimony of their faculty adviser to the effect that some local SDS organizations elsewhere were unaffiliated with any national organization. The hearing officer, in addition to introducing the minutes from the two pertinent Student Affairs Committee meetings, also introduced, sua sponte, portions of a transcript of hearings before the United States House of Representatives Internal Security Committee investigating the activities of SDS. Excerpts were offered both to prove that violent and disruptive activities had been attributed to SDS elsewhere and to demonstrate that there existed a national organization that recognized and cooperated with regional and local college campus affiliates. Petitioners did not challenge the asserted existence of a National SDS, nor did they question that it did have a system of affiliations of some [408 U.S. 169, 179] sort. Their contention was simply that their organization would not associate with that network. Throughout the hearing the parties were acting at cross purposes. What seemed relevant to one appeared completely immaterial to the other. This failure of the hearing to advance the litigation was, at bottom, the consequence of a more basic failure to join issue on the considerations that should control the President’s ultimate decision, a problem to which we will return in the ensuing section.

Upon reviewing the hearing transcript and exhibits, the President reaffirmed his prior decision to deny petitioners recognition as a campus organization. The reasons stated, closely paralleling his initial reasons, were that the group would be a “disruptive influence” at CCSC and that recognition would be “contrary to the orderly process of change” on the campus.

After the President’s second statement issued, the case then returned to the District Court, where it was ordered dismissed. The court concluded, first, that the formal requisites of procedural due process had been complied with, second, that petitioners had failed to meet their burden of showing that they could function free from the National organization, and, third, that the College’s refusal to place its stamp of approval on an organization whose conduct it found “likely to cause violent acts of disruption” did not violate petitioners’ associational rights. 319 F. Supp. 113. 116.

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit where, by a two-to-one vote, the District Court’s judgment was affirmed. The majority purported not to reach the substantive First Amendment issues on the theory that petitioners had failed to avail themselves of the due process accorded them and had failed to meet their burden of complying with the prevailing standards for recognition. 445 F.2d 1122. 1131-1132. Judge [408 U.S. 169, 180] Smith dissented, disagreeing with the majority’s refusal to address the merits and finding that petitioners had been deprived of basic First Amendment rights. Id., at 1136. This Court granted certiorari and, for the reasons that follow, we conclude that the judgments of the courts below must be reversed and the case remanded for reconsideration.

< align="center"p> IIAt the outset we note that state colleges and universities are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First Amendment. “It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, [8]393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). Of course, as Mr. Justice Fortas made clear in Tinker, First Amendment rights must always be applied “in light of the special characteristics of the . . . environment” in the particular case. Ibid. And, where state-operated educational institutions are involved, this Court has long recognized “the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.” Id., at 507. Yet, the precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that, because of the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections should apply with less force on college campuses than in the community at large. Quite to the contrary, “[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools.” Shelton v. Tucker, [9]364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960). The college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the “`marketplace of ideas,'” and we break no new constitutional ground in reaffirming this Nation’s dedication to safeguarding academic [408 U.S. 169, 181] freedom. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, [10]385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, [11]354 U.S. 234, 249 -250 (1957) (plurality opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Warren), 262 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result).

Among the rights protected by the First Amendment is the right of individuals to associate to further their personal beliefs. While the freedom of association is not explicitly set out in the Amendment, it has long been held to be implicit in the freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition. See, e. g., Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, [12]401 U.S. 1, 6 (1971); NAACP v. Button, [13]371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, [14]366 U.S. 293, 296 (1961); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, [15]357 U.S. 449 (1958) (Harlan, J., for a unanimous Court). There can be no doubt that denial of official recognition, without justification, to college organizations burdens or abridges that associational right. The primary impediment to free association flowing from nonrecognition is the denial of use of campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate purposes. The practical effect of nonrecognition was demonstrated in this case when, several days after the President’s decision was announced, petitioners were not allowed to hold a meeting in the campus coffee shop because they were not an approved group.

Petitioners’ associational interests also were circumscribed by the denial of the use of campus bulletin boards and the school newspaper. If an organization is to remain a viable entity in a campus community in which new students enter on a regular basis, it must possess the means of communicating with these students. Moreover, the organization’s ability to participate in the intellectual give and take of campus debate, and to pursue its stated purposes, is limited by denial of access to the customary media for communicating with the administration, [408 U.S. 169, 182] faculty members, and other students. [16]8 Such impediments cannot be viewed as insubstantial.

Respondents and the courts below appear to have taken the view that denial of official recognition in this case abridged no constitutional rights. The District Court concluded that

“President James’ discretionary action in denying this application cannot be legitimately magnified and distorted into a constitutionally cognizable interference with the personal ideas or beliefs of any segment of the college students; neither does his action deter in any material way the individual advocacy of their personal beliefs; nor can his action be reasonably construed to be an invasion of, or having a chilling effect on academic freedom.” 319 F. Supp., at 116.

In that court’s view all that was denied petitioners was the “administrative seal of official college respectability.” [17]9 Ibid. A majority of the Court of Appeals agreed that petitioners had been denied only the “college’s stamp of approval.” 445 F.2d, at 1131. Respondents take that same position here, arguing that petitioners still may meet as a group off campus, that [408 U.S. 169, 183] they still may distribute written material off campus, and that they still may meet together informally on campus – as individuals, but not as CCSC-SDS.

We do not agree with the characterization by the courts below of the consequences of nonrecognition. We may concede, as did Mr. Justice Harlan in his opinion for a unanimous Court in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, [18]357 U.S., at 461 , that the administration “has taken no direct action . . . to restrict the rights of [petitioners] to associate freely . . . .” But the Constitution’s protection is not limited to direct interference with fundamental rights. The requirement in Patterson that the NAACP disclose its membership lists was found to be an impermissible, though indirect, infringement of the members’ associational rights. Likewise, in this case, the group’s possible ability to exist outside the campus community does not ameliorate significantly the disabilities imposed by the President’s action. We are not free to disregard the practical realities. MR. JUSTICE STEWART has made the salient point: “Freedoms such as these are protected not only against heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled by more subtle governmental interference.” Bates v. City of Little Rock, [19]361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960). See also Sweezy v. New Hampshire, [20]354 U.S., at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result); Watkins v. United States, [21]354 U.S. 178, 197 (1957).

The opinions below also assumed that petitioners had the burden of showing entitlement to recognition by the College. [22]10 While petitioners have not challenged the procedural requirement that they file an application in conformity with the rules of the College, [23]11 they do [408 U.S. 169, 184] question the view of the courts below that final rejection could rest on their failure to convince the administration that their organization was unaffiliated with the National SDS. For reasons to be stated later in this opinion, we do not consider the issue of affiliation to be a controlling one. But, apart from any particular issue, once petitioners had filed an application in conformity with the requirements, the burden was upon the College administration to justify its decision of rejection. See, e. g., Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, [24]401 U.S. 154, 162 -163 (1971); United States v. O’Brien, [25]391 U.S. 367, 376 -377 (1968); Speiser v. Randall, [26]357 U.S. 513 (1958). It is to be remembered that the effect of the College’s denial of recognition was a form of prior restraint, denying to petitioners’ organization the range of associational activities described above. While a college has a legitimate interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which under circumstances requiring the safeguarding of that interest may justify such restraint, a “heavy burden” rests on the college to demonstrate the appropriateness of that action. See Near v. Minnesota, [27]283 U.S. 697, 713 -716 (1931); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, [28]402 U.S. 415, 418 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, [29]380 U.S. 51, 57 (1965).

< align="center"p> IIIThese fundamental errors – discounting the existence of a cognizable First Amendment interest and misplacing [408 U.S. 169, 185] the burden of proof – require that the judgments below be reversed. But we are unable to conclude that no basis exists upon which nonrecognition might be appropriate. Indeed, based on a reasonable reading of the ambiguous facts of this case, there appears to be at least one potentially acceptable ground for a denial of recognition. Because of this ambiguous state of the record we conclude that the case should be remanded, and, in an effort to provide guidance to the lower courts upon reconsideration, it is appropriate to discuss the several bases of President James’ decision. Four possible justifications for nonrecognition, all closely related, might be derived from the record and his statements. Three of those grounds are inadequate to substantiate his decision: a fourth, however, has merit.

< align="center"p> AFrom the outset the controversy in this case has centered in large measure around the relationship, if any, between petitioners’ group and the National SDS. The Student Affairs Committee meetings, as reflected in its minutes, focused considerable attention on this issue; the court-ordered hearing also was directed primarily to this question. Despite assurances from petitioners and their counsel that the local group was in fact independent of the National organization, it is evident that President James was significantly influenced by his apprehension that there was a connection. Aware of the fact that some SDS chapters had been associated with disruptive and violent campus activity, he apparently considered that affiliation itself was sufficient justification for denying recognition. [30]12

Although this precise issue has not come before the Court heretofore, the Court has consistently disapproved [408 U.S. 169, 186] governmental action imposing criminal sanctions or denying rights and privileges solely because of a citizen’s association with an unpopular organization. See, e. g., United States v. Robel, [31]389 U.S. 258 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, [32]385 U.S., at 605 -610; Elfbrandt v. Russell, [33]384 U.S. 11 (1966); Scales v. United States, [34]367 U.S. 203 (1961). In these cases it has been established that “guilt by association alone, without [establishing] that an individual’s association poses the threat feared by the Government,” is an impermissible basis upon which to deny First Amendment rights. United States v. Robel, supra, at 265. The government has the burden of establishing a knowing affiliation with an organization possessing unlawful aims and goals, and a specific intent to further those illegal aims. [35]13

Students for a Democratic Society, as conceded by the College and the lower courts, is loosely organized, having various factions and promoting a number of diverse social and political views, only some of which call for unlawful action. [36]14 Not only did petitioners proclaim their complete independence from this organization, [37]15 but they also [408 U.S. 169, 187] indicated that they shared only some of the beliefs its leaders have expressed. [38]16 On this record it is clear that the relationship was not an adequate ground for the denial of recognition.

< align="center"p> BHaving concluded that petitioners were affiliated with, or at least retained an affinity for, National SDS, President James attributed what he believed to be the philosophy of that organization to the local group. He characterized the petitioning group as adhering to “some of the major tenets of the national organization,” including a philosophy of violence and disruption. [39]17 Understandably, he found that philosophy abhorrent. In an article signed by President James in an alumni periodical, and made a part of the record below, he announced his unwillingness to “sanction an organization that openly advocates the destruction of the very ideals and freedoms upon which the academic life is founded.” He further emphasized that the petitioners’ “philosophies” were “counter to the official policy of the college.”

The mere disagreement of the President with the group’s philosophy affords no reason to deny it recognition. As repugnant as these views may have been, especially to one with President James’ responsibility, the mere expression of them would not justify the denial of First Amendment rights. Whether petitioners did in fact advocate a philosophy of “destruction” thus becomes immaterial. The College, acting here as the instrumentality of the State, may not restrict speech or association simply because it finds the views expressed [408 U.S. 169, 188] by any group to be abhorrent. As Mr. Justice Black put it most simply and clearly:

“I do not believe that it can be too often repeated that the freedoms of speech, press, petition and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to the ideas we cherish.” Communist Party v. SACB, [40]367 U.S. 1, 137 (dissenting opinion) (1961).

< align="center"p> CAs the litigation progressed in the District Court, a third rationale for President James’ decision – beyond the questions of affiliation and philosophy – began to emerge. His second statement, issued after the court-ordered hearing, indicates that he based rejection on a conclusion that this particular group would be a “disruptive influence at CCSC.” This language was underscored in the second District Court opinion. In fact, the court concluded that the President had determined that CCSC-SDS’ “prospective campus activities were likely to cause a disruptive influence at CCSC.” 319 F. Supp., at 116.

If this reason, directed at the organization’s activities rather than its philosophy, were factually supported by the record, this Court’s prior decisions would provide a basis for considering the propriety of nonrecognition. The critical line heretofore drawn for determining the permissibility of regulation is the line between mere advocacy and advocacy “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and . . . likely to incite or produce such action.” Brandenburg v. Ohio, [41]395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (unanimous per curiam opinion). See also Scales v. United States, [42]367 U.S., at 230 -232; Noto v. United States, [43]367 U.S. 290, 298 (1961); [408 U.S. 169, 189] Yates v. United States, [44]354 U.S. 298 (1957). In the context of the “special characteristics of the school environment,” [45]18 the power of the government to prohibit “lawless action” is not limited to acts of a criminal nature. Also prohibitable are actions which “materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.” Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, [46]393 U.S., at 513 . Associational activities need not be tolerated where they infringe reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes, or substantially interfere with the opportunity of other students to obtain an education.

The “Student Bill of Rights” at CCSC, upon which great emphasis was placed by the President, draws precisely this distinction between advocacy and action. It purports to impose no limitations on the right of college student organizations “to examine and discuss all questions of interest to them.” (Emphasis supplied.) But it also states that students have no right (1) “to deprive others of the opportunity to speak or be heard,” (2) “to invade the privacy of others,” (3) “to damage the property of others,” (4) “to disrupt the regular and essential operation of the college,” or (5) “to interfere with the rights of others,” [47]19 The line between permissible speech and impermissible conduct tracks the constitutional requirement, and if there were an evidential basis to support the conclusion that CCSC-SDS posed a substantial threat of material disruption in violation of that command the President’s decision should be affirmed. [48]20 [408 U.S. 169, 190]

The record, however, offers no substantial basis for that conclusion. The only support for the view expressed by the President, other than the reputed affiliation with National SDS, is to be found in the ambivalent responses offered by the group’s representatives at the Student Affairs Committee hearing, during which they stated that they did not know whether they might respond to “issues of violence” in the same manner that other SDS chapters had on other campuses. Nor would they state unequivocally that they could never “envision . . . interrupting a class.” Whatever force these statements might be thought to have is largely dissipated by the following exchange between petitioners’ counsel and the Dean of Student Affairs during the court-ordered hearing:

Counsel: “. . . I just read the document that you’re offering [minutes from Student Affairs Committee meeting] and I can’t see that there’s anything in it that intimates that these students contemplate any illegal or disruptive practice.”

Dean: “No. There’s no question raised to that, counselor . . . .” App. 73-74.

Dean Judd’s remark reaffirms, in accord with the full record, that there was no substantial evidence that these particular individuals acting together would constitute [408 U.S. 169, 191] a disruptive force on campus. Therefore, insofar as nonrecognition flowed from such fears, it constituted little more than the sort of “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance [which] is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.” Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, [49]393 U.S., at 508 .

align=”center”D

These same references in the record to the group’s equivocation regarding how it might respond to “issues of violence” and whether it could ever “envision . . . interrupting a class,” suggest a fourth possible reason why recognition might have been denied to these petitioners. These remarks might well have been read as announcing petitioners’ unwillingness to be bound by reasonable school rules governing conduct. The College’s Statement of Rights, Freedoms, and Responsibilities of Students contains, as we have seen, an explicit statement with respect to campus disruption. The regulation, carefully differentiating between advocacy and action, is a reasonable one, and petitioners have not questioned it directly. [50]21 Yet their statements raise considerable question whether they intend to abide by the prohibitions contained therein. [51]22 [408 U.S. 169, 192]

As we have already stated in Parts B and C, the critical line for First Amendment purposes must be drawn between advocacy, which is entitled to full protection, and action, which is not. Petitioners may, if they so choose, preach the propriety of amending or even doing away with any or all campus regulations. They may not, however, undertake to flout these rules. MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, at the time he was a circuit judge on the Eighth Circuit, stated:

“We . . . hold that a college has the inherent power to promulgate rules and regulations; that it has the inherent power properly to discipline; that it has power appropriately to protect itself and its property; that it may expect that its students adhere to generally accepted standards of conduct.” Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1089 (CA8 1969), cert. denied, [52]398 U.S. 965 (1970).

Just as in the community at large, reasonable regulations with respect to the time, the place, and the manner in which student groups conduct their speech-related [408 U.S. 169, 193] activities must be respected. [53]23 A college administration may impose a requirement, such as may have been imposed in this case, that a group seeking official recognition affirm in advance its willingness to adhere to reasonable campus law. Such a requirement does not impose an impermissible condition on the students’ associational rights. Their freedom to speak out, to assemble, or to petition for changes in school rules is in no sense infringed. It merely constitutes an agreement to conform with reasonable standards respecting conduct. This is a minimal requirement, in the interest of the entire academic community, of any group seeking the privilege of official recognition.

Petitioners have not challenged in this litigation the procedural or substantive aspects of the College’s requirements governing applications for official recognition. Although the record is unclear on this point, CCSC may have, among its requirements for recognition, a rule that prospective groups affirm that they intend to comply with reasonable campus regulations. Upon remand it should first be determined whether the College recognition procedures contemplate any such requirement. If so, it should then be ascertained whether petitioners intend to comply. Since we do not have the terms of a specific prior affirmation rule before us, we are not called on to decide whether any particular formulation would or would not prove constitutionally acceptable. Assuming the existence of a valid rule, however, we do conclude that the benefits of participation in the internal life of the college community may be denied to any [408 U.S. 169, 194] group that reserves the right to violate any valid campus rules with which it disagrees. [54]24

< align="center"p> IVWe think the above discussion establishes the appropriate framework for consideration of petitioners’ request for campus recognition. Because respondents failed to accord due recognition to First Amendment principles, the judgments below approving respondents’ denial of recognition must be reversed. Since we cannot conclude from this record that petitioners were willing to abide by reasonable campus rules and regulations, we order the case remanded for reconsideration. We note, in so holding, that the wide latitude accorded by the Constitution to the freedoms of expression and association is not without its costs in terms of the risk to the maintenance of civility and an ordered society. Indeed, this latitude often has resulted, on the campus and elsewhere, in the infringement of the rights of others. Though we deplore the tendency of some to abuse the very constitutional privileges they invoke, and although the infringement of rights of others certainly should not be tolerated, we reaffirm this Court’s dedication to the principles of the Bill of Rights upon which our vigorous and free society is founded.

Reversed and remanded.

Footnotes

[ [55]Footnote 1 ] See Report of the President’s Commission on Campus Unrest (1970); Report of the American Bar Association Commission on Campus Government and Student Dissent (1970).

[ [56]Footnote 2 ] The statement of purposes is set out as an Appendix to the Second Circuit’s opinion and appears following the dissent thereto. 445 F.2d 1122, 1135-1139 (1971).

[ [57]Footnote 3 ] 445 F.2d, at 1133. During the Committee’s consideration of petitioners’ application, one of the group’s representatives was asked why, if it indeed desired to remain independent, it chose to use a nationally known name. The witness’ response was that “the name brings to mind the type of organization we wish to bring across, that is, a left-wing organization which will allow students interested in such to express themselves.”

[ [58]Footnote 4 ] The President stated:

“Though I have full appreciation for the action of the Student Affairs Committee and the reasons stated in their minutes for the majority vote recommending approval of a local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society, it is my judgment that the statement of purpose to form a local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society carries full and unmistakable adherence to at least some of the major tenets of the national organization, loose and divided though that organization may be. The published aims and philosophy of the Students for a Democratic Society, which include disruption and violence, are contrary to the approved policy (by faculty, students, and administration) of Central Connecticut State College which states:

“`Students do not have the right to invade the privacy of others, to damage the property of others, to disrupt the regular and essential [408 U.S. 169, 175] operation of the college, or to interfere with the rights of others.’

“The further statement on the request for recognition that `CCSC Students for a Democratic Society are not under the dictates of any National organization’ in no way clarifies why if a group intends to follow the established policy of the college, they wish to become a local chapter of an organization which openly repudiates such a policy.

“Freedom of speech, academic freedom on the campus, the freedom of establishing an open forum for the exchange of ideas, the freedoms outlined in the Statement on Rights, Freedoms, and Responsibilities of Students that `college students and student organizations shall have the right to examine and discuss all questions of interest to them, to express opinion publicly and privately, and to support causes by orderly means. They may organize public demonstrations and protest gatherings and utilize the right of petition’ – these are all precious freedoms that we cherish and are freedoms on which we stand. To approve any organization or individual who joins with an organization which openly repudiates those principles is contrary to those freedoms and to the approved `Statement on the Rights, Freedoms, and Responsibilities of Students’ at Central.” App. 15-16.

[ [59]Footnote 5 ] In 1969, CCSC adopted, as have many other colleges and universities, a Statement on Rights, Freedoms and Responsibilities of Students. This statement, commonly referred to as the “Student Bill of Rights,” is printed as an Appendix to the Second Circuit’s majority opinion in this case, 445 F.2d, at 1135-1139, see n. 2, supra. Part V of that statement establishes the standards for approval of campus organizations and imposes several basic limitations on their campus activities:

“A Care shall be taken in the establishment and organization of campus groups so that the basic rights, freedoms and responsibilities of students will be preserved.

“B. Student organizations shall submit a clear statement of purpose, criteria for membership, rules of procedures and a list of officers as a condition of institutional recognition. They shall not be required to submit a membership list as a condition of institutional recognition.

“C. Membership in campus organizations shall be limited to [408 U.S. 169, 176] matriculated students (day or evening) at the college. Membership shall not be restricted by race, religion or nationality. The members shall have sole power to determine organization policy consistent with the regulations of the college.

“D. Each organization is free to choose its own adviser. Advisers to organizations shall advise but not control the organizations and their policies.

“E. College students and student organizations shall have the right to examine and discuss all questions of interest to them, to express opinion publicly and privately, and to support causes by orderly means. They may organize public demonstrations and protest gatherings and utilize the right of petition. Students do not have the right to deprive others of the opportunity to speak or be heard, to invade the privacy of others, to damage the property of others, to disrupt the regular and essential operation of the college, or to interfere with the rights of others.”

[ [60]Footnote 6 ] During the meeting petitioners were approached by two of the College’s deans, who served petitioners with a memorandum from the President stating:

“Notice has been received by this office of a meeting of the [408 U.S. 169, 177] `C. C. S. C.-S. D. S. on Thursday – November 6 at 7:00 p. m. at the Devils’ Den.’

“Such meeting may not take place in the Devils’ Den of the Student Center nor in or on any other property of the college since the C. C. S. C.-S. D. S. is not a duly recognized college organization.

“You are hereby notified by this action to cease and desist from meeting on college property.”

[ [61]Footnote 7 ] 319 F. Supp. 113, 114 (1970). The hearing officer, over petitioners’ objection, ruled that the statement was inadmissible, apparently on the ground that it would constitute an amendment to the original application and would be beyond the permissible scope of the hearing. Whatever the merits of this ruling, the statement was in the record reviewed by the President and was relied on in the subsequent District Court opinion without reference to its prior exclusion. Ibid.

[ [62]Footnote 8 ] It is unclear on this record whether recognition also carries with it a right to seek funds from the school budget. Petitioners’ counsel at oral argument indicated that official recognition entitled the group to “make application for use of student funds.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. The first District Court opinion, however, states flatly that “[r]ecognition does not thereby entitle an organization to college financial support.” 311 F. Supp. 1275, 1277. Since it appears that, at the least, recognition only entitles a group to apply for funds, and since the record is silent as to the criteria used in allocating such funds, we do not consider possible funding as an associational aspect of nonrecognition in this case.

[ [63]Footnote 9 ] These statements are in contrast to the first opinion by the District Court, which reflected a full appreciation of the constitutional significance of petitioners’ claim. 311 F. Supp., at 1280-1282.

[ [64]Footnote 10 ] 445 F.2d, at 1131; 319 F. Supp., at 116.

[ [65]Footnote 11 ] The standards for official recognition require applicants to provide a clear statement of purposes, criteria for membership, rules of procedure, and a list of officers. Applicants must limit membership [408 U.S. 169, 184] to “matriculated students” and may not discriminate on the basis of race, religion or nationality. The standards further state that groups may “examine and discuss all questions of interest,” and they may conduct demonstrations and utilize their right of petition, but they are prohibited from interfering with the rights of other students. See n. 5, supra. Petitioners have not challenged these standards and their validity is not here in question.

[ [66]Footnote 12 ] See n. 4, supra, for the complete text of the President’s statement.

[ [67]Footnote 13 ] In addition to the cases cited in the text above, see also Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, [68]401 U.S. 154, 164 -166 (1971); In re Stolar, [69]401 U.S. 23, 28 (1971); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, [70]378 U.S. 500 (1964); Noto v. United States, [71]367 U.S. 290, 299 -300 (1961).

[ [72]Footnote 14 ] See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, p. 916 (1972), in which the former Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, J. Edgar Hoover, stated that while violent factions have spun off from SDS, its present leadership is “critical of bombing and violence.”

[ [73]Footnote 15 ] Petitioners asserted their independence both orally and in a written submission before the Student Affairs Committee. They restated their nonaffiliation in a formal statement filed prior to the court-ordered hearing. The only indication to the contrary is their unwillingness to eschew use of the SDS name altogether. But see n. 3, supra.

[ [74]Footnote 16 ] Representatives of the group stated during the Student Affairs Committee meetings that they did not identify with all of the National’s statements, but wished simply to “pick . . . certain ideas” from that organization.

[ [75]Footnote 17 ] See n. 4, supra.

[ [76]Footnote 18 ] Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, [77]393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).

[ [78]Footnote 19 ] See n. 5, supra.

[ [79]Footnote 20 ] It may not be sufficient merely to show the existence of a legitimate and substantial state interest. Where state action designed to regulate prohibitable action also restricts associational rights – as nonrecognition does – the State must demonstrate that the action [408 U.S. 169, 190] taken is reasonably related to protection of the State’s interest and that “the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” United States v. O’Brien, [80]391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). See also NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, [81]377 U.S. 288 (1964); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, [82]372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, [83]357 U.S. 449 (1958). On this record, absent a showing of any likelihood of disruption or unwillingness to recognize reasonable rules governing campus conduct, it is not necessary for us to decide whether denial of recognition is an appropriately related and narrow response.

[ [84]Footnote 21 ] See n. 5, supra.

[ [85]Footnote 22 ] The Court of Appeals found that petitioners “failed candidly to respond to inquiries whether they would resort to violence and disruption on the CCSC campus, including interruption of classes.” 445 F.2d, at 1131. While petitioners’ statements may be read as intimating a rejection of reasonable regulations in advance, there is in fact substantial ambiguity on this point. The questions asked by members of the Student Affairs Committee do not appear to have been propounded with any clear distinction in mind between that which the petitioners might advocate and the conduct in which they might engage. Nor did the Student Affairs Committee attempt to obtain a clarification of the petitioners’ ambiguous answers by [408 U.S. 169, 192] asking specifically whether the group was willing to abide by the Student Bill of Rights governing all campus organizations.

Moreover, this question was not among those referred by the District Court to the administrative hearing, and it was there addressed only tangentially. The group members who had made statements before the Student Affairs Committee did not testify, and their position was not clarified. Their counsel, whose tactics were characterized as “disruptive” by the Court of Appeals, elected to make argumentative statements rather than elicit relevant testimony. Id., at 1126. Indeed, the District Court’s failure to identify the question of willingness to abide by the College’s rules and regulations as a significant subject of inquiry, coupled with the equivocation on the part of the group’s representatives, lends support to our view that a remand is necessary.

[ [86]Footnote 23 ] See, e. g., Adderley v. Florida, [87]385 U.S. 39, 47 -48 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, [88]379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, [89]366 U.S. 293, 297 (1961).

[ [90]Footnote 24 ] In addition to the College administration’s broad rulemaking power to assure that the traditional academic atmosphere is safeguarded, it may also impose sanctions on those who violate the rules. We find, for instance, that the Student Affairs Committee’s admonition to petitioners in this case suggests one permissible practice – recognition, once accorded, may be withdrawn or suspended if petitioners fail to respect campus law. See, e. g., University of Southern Mississippi Chapter of Mississippi Civil Liberties Union v. University of Southern Mississippi, 452 F.2d 564 (CA5 1971); American Civil Liberties Union v. Radford College, 315 F. Supp. 893 (WD Va. 1970). [408 U.S. 169, 195]

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring.

I am in agreement with what is said in the Court’s opinion and I join in it. I do so because I read the basis of the remand as recognizing that student organizations seeking the privilege of official campus recognition must be willing to abide by valid rules of the institution applicable to all such organizations. This is a reasonable condition insofar as it calls for the disavowal of resort to force, disruption, and interference with the rights of others.

The District Judge was troubled by the lack of a comprehensive procedural scheme that would inform students of the steps to be taken to secure recognized standing, and by the lack of articulated criteria to be used in evaluating eligibility for recognition. It was for this reason, as I read the record, that he remanded the matter to the college for a factual inquiry and for a more orderly processing in a de novo hearing within the college administrative structure. It is within that structure and within the academic community that problems such as these should be resolved. The courts, state or federal, should be a last resort. Part of the educational experience of every college student should be an experience in responsible self-government and this must be a joint enterprise of students and faculty. It should not be imposed unilaterally from above, nor can the terms of the relationship be dictated by students. Here, in spite of the wisdom of the District Court in sending the case back to the college, the issue identified by the Court’s opinion today was not adequately addressed in the hearing.

The relatively placid life of the college campus of the past has not prepared either administrators or students for their respective responsibilities in maintaining an atmosphere in which divergent views can be asserted [408 U.S. 169, 196] vigorously, but civilly, to the end that those who seek to be heard accord the same right to all others. The “Statement on Rights, Freedoms and Responsibilities of Students,” sometimes called the “Student Bill of Rights,” in effect on this campus, and not questioned by petitioners, reflected a rational adjustment of the competing interests. But it is impossible to know from the record in this case whether the student group was willing to acknowledge an obligation to abide by that “Bill of Rights.”

Against this background, the action of the Court in remanding on this issue is appropriate.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS.

While I join the opinion of the Court, I add a few words.

As Dr. Birenbaum [91]* says, the status quo of the college or university is the governing body (trustees or overseers), administrative officers, who include caretakers, and the police, and the faculty. Those groups have well-defined or vaguely inferred values to perpetuate. The customary technique has been to conceive of the minds of students as receptacles for the information which the faculty have garnered over the years. Education is commonly thought of as the process of filling the receptacles with what the faculty in its wisdom deems fit and proper.

Many, inside and out of faculty circles, realize that one of the main problems of faculty members is their own re-education or re-orientation. Some have narrow specialties that are hardly relevant to modern times. History has passed others by, leaving them interesting relics of a bygone day. More often than not they represent those who withered under the pressures of McCarthyism or other forces of conformity and represent [408 U.S. 169, 197] but a timid replica of those who once brought distinction to the ideal of academic freedom.

The confrontation between them and the oncoming students has often been upsetting. The problem is not one of choosing sides. Students – who, by reason of the Twenty-sixth Amendment, become eligible to vote when 18 years of age – are adults who are members of the college or university community. Their interests and concerns are often quite different from those of the faculty. They often have values, views, and ideologies that are at war with the ones which the college has traditionally espoused or indoctrinated. When they ask for change, they, the students, speak in the tradition of Jefferson and Madison and the First Amendment.

The First Amendment does not authorize violence. But it does authorize advocacy, group activities, and espousal of change.

The present case is minuscule in the events of the 60’s and 70’s. But the fact that it has to come here for ultimate resolution indicates the sickness of our academic world, measured by First Amendment standards. Students as well as faculty are entitled to credentials in their search for truth. If we are to become an integrated, adult society, rather than a stubborn status quo opposed to change, students and faculties should have communal interests in which each age learns from the other. Without ferment of one kind or another, a college or university (like a federal agency or other human institution) becomes a useless appendage to a society which traditionally has reflected the spirit of rebellion.

APPENDIX TO OPINION OF DOUGLAS, J.

“A compulsory ghetto fails as a community because its inhabitants lack the power to develop common goals and to pursue them effectively together. It fails too [408 U.S. 169, 198] because of a fatal disconnection between the possession and use of power and the cognition that knowledge, as a form of power, carries with it political responsibility. In these respects the campus is now like the compulsory ghetto.

“Those who deplore a view of the university in terms of its powerful political role in American society must account for the institution’s use of political power in its own terms, for its own purposes. I have come to feel lately – partly, I guess, because of the legal reasoning styles to which I have been exposed – that those playing around with the structure of their universities these days are playing with tinker toys. New committees, new senates and new student-participation formulae do not necessarily mean that anything has changed. Indeed, if Berkeley, Columbia, Harvard and Chicago are valid examples, restructuring turns out to be one of the brilliant new inventions for sustaining the status quo. The vested interests and essential privileges involved in current efforts to restructure the university have yet completely to surface. A substantial part of our melting iceberg is still below the waterline.

“That part of the student critique of the university which most deserves our attention bears upon what we teach, how we teach it, and the terms on which it is taught. One of the interesting things their critique points out is that our building programs, corporate investments, relationships to the immediate community and to the society, and our views of citizenship inside the university, all turn out to be projections and applications of what we call or have called education. Their critique suggests the perfectly absurd conclusion that there is a relationship between their long hair and our long war, between being a nurse and being a Negro, between the freshman political-science course and the pollution of fresh air, between education for freedom and [408 U.S. 169, 199] being free. Obviously, the contemporary American student activist is crazy.

“We have probably made a mistake by revealing to our students that there really is too much to know, and only one way to learn it – our way. They have come to accept this as gospel, and it has encouraged them to view curriculum development as essentially a sophisticated art of selection, interpretation and emphasis in which they have a vested interest. Understanding this, naturally they have begun to ask the key political questions bearing upon our vested interests and privileges: What experience and talent should be empowered to select? Who should be empowered to employ those who will interpret, and to deploy the wealth required to support the enterprise?

“Obviously the control over who will be kept out and over punishment-and-reward systems inside is extremely important. While our students still generally concede that the older adults who teach them may know something they don’t they are also asserting the uniqueness of their own experience, claiming that they may know something which those now in charge don’t. They have returned to the kindergarten level to rediscover a principle long revered in American education – that the student plays a positive and active role, that he has something definite and essential to contribute to his own education.

“The young – suspended precariously in a society obsessed by Vietnam violence, race violence, crime violence and culture violence – are restating the eternal questions about education: What is important to learn, and how may people best learn together? Regarding these enduring questions, they are also asking the eternal question of a society which officially encourages its young to grow up free (even while keeping them in bondage), namely: Who shall judge? Regarding the problems [408 U.S. 169, 200] these questions suggest, academic tradition responds through an uptight delineation of jurisdictions and powers within the university.

. . . . .

“Today’s campus disruptions were born in the years 1776 to 1787. Although the mind of Thomas Jefferson was anchored in the traditions of Heidelberg, Oxford, Paris, Bologna, Rome, Greece, the religions of the early Christians and the ancient Hebrews, minds like his transformed the old into something quite new, as in the case of his proposal for a university in Virginia. What was created then was not, of course, the latest thing, nor was it necessarily the Truth. But it was an adventure, a genuine new departure, unlike most of the institutions of learning we have created in this country since the Morrill Act – that is, most of our higher-education establishment.

“The traditions of the university in the West are anti- if not counter-revolutionary. Operating within these traditions, the university has produced revolutionary knowledge, but institutionally the uses of the knowledge have been directed mainly toward the confirmation of the status quo, particularly the political and cultural status quo. The themes of peace, integration, equality, freedom and the humane uses of knowledge are ones which traditionally fall beyond the purview of the university.

“But in principle the main themes of our society run counter to this deployment of knowledge. In spite of Vietnam, poverty, racism and the overbearing logic of our technology – in spite of Bedford-Stuyvesant – the main themes of our country, in principle, were and still are revolutionary. They are reflected in such questions as these: Can the revolutionary knowledge developed in the universities be used humanely, to conform with what Jefferson and his colleagues apparently meant? What [408 U.S. 169, 201] does equality mean, and whatever it meant or means, can we still achieve a version of it consistent with this adventure? Are reason and democracy really consistent? Is war in behalf of peace, given what we know now, realistic? Can Negroes who were once property suddenly become people? Are some genocides more decent than others, some cesspools more fragrant than others?

“In any event, I know that Bedford-Stuyvesant is crammed full of red-white-and-blue Americans. They really believe that we ought to practice what we preach, and that’s the problem. We’ve oversold America to ourselves, and so many of my very good friends – looking at the street violence and the circuses in the courts and on the campuses – who believe we confront a deeply un-American phenomenon, who think we face a serious threat to American values, completely misread what is going on there. We face a vibrant, far-reaching reassertion of what this country claims, what it has always claimed it is.” W. Birenbaum, Something For Everybody Is Not Enough 67-69, 248-249.

[ [92]Footnote * ] See the Appendix to this opinion.

MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, concurring in the result.

While I do not subscribe to some of the language in the Court’s opinion, I concur in the result that it reaches. As I understand the Court’s holding, the case is sent back for reconsideration because respondents may not have made it sufficiently clear to petitioners that the decision as to recognition would be critically influenced by petitioners’ willingness to agree in advance to abide by reasonable regulations promulgated by the college.

I find the implication clear from the Court’s opinion that the constitutional limitations on the government’s acting as administrator of a college differ from the limitations on the government’s acting as sovereign to enforce its criminal laws. The Court’s quotations from Tinker [408 U.S. 169, 202] v. Des Moines Independent School District, [93]393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969), to the effect that First Amendment rights must always be applied “in light of the special characteristics of the . . . environment,” and from Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1089 (CA8 1969), to the effect that a college “may expect that its students adhere to generally accepted standards of conduct,” emphasize this fact.

Cases such as United Public Workers v. Mitchell, [94]330 U.S. 75 (1947), and Pickering v. Board of Education, [95]391 U.S. 563 (1968), make it equally clear that the government in its capacity as employer also differs constitutionally from the government in its capacity as the sovereign executing criminal laws. The Court in Pickering said:

“The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” [96]391 U.S., at 568 .

Because of these acknowledged distinctions of constitutional dimension based upon the role of the government, I have serious doubt as to whether cases dealing with the imposition of criminal sanctions, such as Brandenburg v. Ohio, [97]395 U.S. 444 (1969), Scales v. United States, [98]367 U.S. 203 (1961), and Yates v. United States, [99]354 U.S. 298 (1957), are properly applicable to this case dealing with the government as college administrator. I also doubt whether cases dealing with the prior restraint imposed by injunctive process of a court, such as Near v. Minnesota, [100]283 U.S. 697 (1931), are precisely comparable to this case, in which a typical sanction imposed was the requirement that the group abandon its plan to meet in the college coffee shop. [408 U.S. 169, 203]

Prior cases dealing with First Amendment rights are not fungible goods, and I think the doctrine of these cases suggests two important distinctions. The government as employer or school administrator may impose upon employees and students reasonable regulations that would be impermissible if imposed by the government upon all citizens. And there can be a constitutional distinction between the infliction of criminal punishment, on the one hand, and the imposition of milder administrative or disciplinary sanctions, on the other, even though the same First Amendment interest is implicated by each.

Because some of the language used by the Court tends to obscure these distinctions, which I believe to be important, I concur only in the result. [408 U.S. 169, 204]